Pluralism

Identification

Pluralism cannot be defined as a singular entity – it exists in multiple fields and forms. Kateb identifies four central kinds of pluralism in Flathman’s Pluralism: “the inner plurality of every individual human being; the pluralism of diverse individuals in a given society; social or cultural pluralism…and global pluralism” (12). Though, as he addresses in his work, Kateb has omitted religious pluralism. We understand that pluralism, in its most general sense, is essentially a coexistence of more than one entity, whether these entities are political doctrines, ethical codes, cultural practices, or conflicting ideologies. Robert Talisse, in Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics, asserts that pluralism is “used to characterize the attitude of open-mindedness and the willingness to non-repressively tolerate…the diversity of worthwhile pursuits to which humans may devote themselves” (88). Talisse illustrates here the relationship between pluralism and peaceful coexistence within diverse societies. However, and in keeping with the theme of this course, the focus will be on political pluralism. In The Idea of Political Pluralism, Galston defines political pluralism as “an understanding of social life that comprises multiple sources of authority—individuals, parents, civil associations, faith based institutions, and the state, among others—no one of which is dominant in all” (96). By defining political pluralism as a social “understanding” rather than a decisive political system, Galston implies that it does not, or should not, exist on its own in terms of political governance, he simply identifies it in his work as an aspect of politics which is necessary to a more harmonious society, one in which no source of authority dominates the other to potentially cause conflict. In terms of a ‘when’, political pluralism can be traced back as having began in 19^th century Europe, “as a reaction to the growing tendency to see state institutions as plenipotentiary” (Galston 101), indeed in reaction to the growing consciousness of state autocracy.

Historical significance

Galston offers his view on the importance of pluralism to contemporary politics, referring to state control, he poses that the state “…may not seek to force their citizens into one-size-fits-all patterns of desirable human lives. Any public policy that relies on, promotes, or commands a single conception of human good…as equally valid for all individuals is…illegitimate” (Galston 96). Galston highlights the necessity of pluralism in politics to the human experience, that a political system must be pluralistic in order to be inclusive, and to match the diversities inherent in societies. He later makes the assertion that political pluralism exists as “an alternative to all forms of civic totalism”, presenting it as our most viable option to avoid a tyrannical state. Galston continues, “…pluralism rejects the instrumental/teleological argument that individuals, families, and associations are adequately understood as ‘for the sake of’ some political purpose” (106), here illustrating pluralism’s promotion of individual liberties. Pluralism’s promotion of a liberal, inclusive society that rejects totalitarianism has been extremely influential to contemporary society as revolts continue to erupt around the world in the face of tyranny (e.g. the 2011 Arab Spring, the Palestinian intifada, political activism in the West). Pluralism, as a philosophy in reaction to plenipotentiary government, illuminates an emergence of opposition amongst many towards this lack of democracy, and a movement towards democratic liberalism as a possible solution. Galston roots this growing awareness of plenipotentiary government in Western history, “This tendency took various practical forms in different countries: French anticlerical republicanism, British parliamentary supremacy, the drive for national unification in Germany and Italy against subordinate political and social powers” (Galston 101).

Key historical proponents

Though preceding the movement for political pluralism by roughly two centuries, Hobbes (1588-1679) famously defended autocratic government, while contradicting the fundamentals of pluralism. He believed, referring to autocratic government, that “any less robust form of politics would in practice countenance divided sovereignty…an open invitation to civic conflict and war” (Galston 101). Supporters of Hobbes’ political views fervently opposed the liberal pluralists of the 19^th century. Galston also identifies Rousseau as having views that conflict with the later emerging pluralism, Rousseau believed that, “Loyalties divided between the republic and other ties…are bound to dilute civic spirit. And the liberal appeal to private life as against public life will only legitimize selfishness at the expense of the spirit of contribution and sacrifice without which the polity cannot endure.” Rousseau attacks the still relevant idea of liberal individualism, instead advocating a complete loyalty to the state. In doing so, Rousseau provided the framework for an argument used by many anti-pluralists in the 19^th century, as well as in the modern day. A prominent anti-pluralist influenced by Rousseau is Emile Combes (1902-1905), Galston explains, “Emile Combes, a turn-of-the-century premier in the French Third Republic, declared that “there are, there can be no rights except the right of the State, and there [is], and there can be no other authority than the authority of the Republic”” (Galston 102). Combes clearly advocates complete state control, an ideal that is inconsistent with pluralism’s focus on individual liberties.

As for supporters of pluralism, these included “Berlin and his many contemporary disciples, including William Galston, George Crowder, John Kekes, and John Gray” (Talisse 88), as advocates of value pluralism – a pluralism which rejects the idea of living life “based on a singular ordering of values” (Galston 96). Berlin acknowledges criticisms of pluralism that dismiss it for allowing the existence of contradicting ideals, Berlin asserts that conflicting values were a necessary consequence of pluralism, “According to Berlin we must trade off between equality and liberty, not because we do not command the resources to realize them both, but because it is in the nature of the values themselves to collide” (Talisse 89).

Fatima Al Setri

 

Bibliography

Kateb, George. “Flathman’s Pluralism.” The Good Society Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006): 11-14. Print.

Talisse, Robert B. “Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol. 14 No. 1 (2011): 87-100. Print.

Galston, William A. “The Idea of Political Pluralism.” Nomos Vol. 49 (2009): 95-124. Print.